''Today a minister, tomorrow the prime minister...''/ Turkish media: SPAK investigations led to the reformation of the Rama government

2026-02-27 18:42:27 / POLITIKË ALFA PRESS

''Today a minister, tomorrow the prime minister...''/

From a distance, it looks procedural.
A cabinet reshuffle.
A reassigned portfolio.
A new deputy prime minister.
The language is managerial. Responsible. Calm.

But politics is not about documents. It is about power—who exercises it, who limits it, and who, ultimately, bends it.

The decision to replace Belinda Balluku, however skillfully presented as part of a broader reshuffle, was a letdown. And there is no elegant way to disguise that fact.

Balluku was suspended, not convicted. No court decision forced his removal. No indictment tested in adversarial proceedings required immediate political suspension. The very timeline of the investigation suggests that any courtroom confrontation remains distant.

The movement was not constitutionally inevitable.
It was politically reactive.
And that distinction matters.

There is growing concern—which cannot be dismissed as partisan paranoia—that the Special Structure Against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) has operated with a worryingly low threshold of evidence in high-profile cases. Presumptive suspicion, prosecutorial ambition, and public whistleblowing have often been enough to cause political repercussions before legal standards are rigorously tested.

In any functioning democracy, investigations are necessary. But investigations are not decisions. And when the threshold for initiating politically explosive cases seems calibrated for maximum disruption rather than maximum evidence, prosecutors cease to be simply legal actors. They become political actors—whether by design or as a structural effect.

This is worrying.

Because when an accusation becomes a conviction, a suspension becomes a sentence. And when governments restructure in anticipation of prosecutorial pressure rather than judicial conclusion, the constitutional balance begins to tilt.

Add to this a more unpleasant reality: some international actors, wrapped in the language of reform and the rule of law, have shown an appetite for influence that goes beyond oversight to expediency. External pressure, amplified through institutional channels and diplomatic signaling, can easily shift from partnership to power arbitrage.

At that point, the question ceases to be legal. It becomes existential.

Is it about accountability—or control?

If prosecutorial momentum, reinforced by external pressure, becomes the mechanism through which elected leadership is gradually weakened, then the democratic will expressed at the ballot box is being indirectly circumvented.

Not from the voters.
From the process.

There is no embellishment to this.

The reformatting was a concession. It signaled that pressure works. It demonstrated that institutional escalation produces structural change. And it came at the beginning of a renewed mandate—a mandate that was supposed to consolidate authority, not recalibrate it.

Power rarely stops at the first release.

Once the logic of judicial primacy over electoral legitimacy is accepted, the end is predictable. Today, a minister. Tomorrow, a party figure. Eventually, the prime minister himself.

If the ultimate objective—implicit or explicit—is to overthrow the head of government through judicial exhaustion rather than electoral defeat, then we are no longer operating within a healthy democratic tension. We are witnessing a slow transfer of sovereignty from voters to institutional actors whose accountability is much less direct.

This is not an argument against the law.

It is an argument against imbalance.

If the violation is proven in court, consequences must follow. But governments should not be restructured in advance of the investigation phase simply to demonstrate compliance with pressure, whether domestic or international.

Authority, once undermined in small steps, is rarely fully recovered.

So let's speak clearly.

This should be the last release.

Either the prime minister governs on his own terms, setting the threshold of political consequence at the judicial conclusion and not at the investigative suggestion, or he should resign now and spare the country a protracted drama in which the elected authority is eroded step by step.

Because there is no middle ground between governing and being governed by a force you don't control.

In politics, vulnerability is cumulative. The leaks pile up. And once opponents—institutional or otherwise—sense vulnerability, they don't back down.

They progress.

There is no embellishment to this.

Stand and draw the line.
Or open your arms./ Translated by Alfapress.al, article by Turkish media Turkiye Today

Happening now...

ideas